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Abstract 
In this paper, I establish a positive correlation between wage dispersion and GDP at business cycle 
frequencies. Moreover, I provide a rationale for the procyclical properties of wage dispersion by 
studying a dynamic search model with wage-posting in which workers can get multiple job offers each 
period. I analyze the channels through which the business cycle influences the shape of the wage 
distribution. The presence of search frictions gives firms monopsony power, i.e., power to impose 
wage levels on workers, and generates differences in wage policy across firms. The speed at which 
workers can move to other jobs affects the degree of firms competition over workers and impacts the 
extent to which firms exploit their monopsony power. Therefore, in booms, the value of workers' 
outside option goes up as the quantity and the quality of job offers increase, and this, in turn, erodes 
the firms' monopsony power in wage setting. In consequence, firms post more high-paying vacancies. 
This strategic reaction of firms thickens the upper tail of the wage distribution, shifts the mass of the 
wages to the right and, as a result, generates a larger wage dispersion. 
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1 Introduction
This paper empirically documents and theoretically grounds the cyclical behavior
of wage dispersion. The interest in this issue is motivated by the fact that, while
a consensus seems to exist about the countercyclicality of income inequality,1 2
the empirical analysis undertaken in the present paper suggests that wage disper-
sion behaves procyclically over the period 1967-2005. Such procyclical properties
of wage dispersion have normative implications. Many labor market institutions
(minimum wage, unemployment benefits, public education) and fiscal policies (pro-
gressive taxation) are designed to reduce economic inequality. Moreover, wage
dispersion is identified as the most important driver of income inequality,3 and, in
turn, transmits into consumption inequality. The prominent role played by wage
dispersion in driving economic inequality, and the linkage between wage dispersion
and the design of optimal redistributive measures suggest the importance of en-
hancing the understanding of wage dispersion, not only by analyzing its level but
also by examining its dynamics and cyclical properties.
Using US CPS - March data, I show that wage dispersion, measured by the
variance of log wages and percentile ratios, is positively correlated with GDP and
negatively correlated with the unemployment rate. This observation indicates the
procyclicality of wage dispersion. I isolate the residual component of the overall
wage dispersion by controlling for demographic characteristics of workers in order
to obtain the residual wage dispersion, i.e., the wage dispersion observed among
workers sharing similar observable characteristics. By comparing the cyclical com-
ponents of wage dispersion and of residual wage dispersion, I find that the cyclical
fluctuations in wage dispersion are almost entirely driven by the fluctuations in
residual wage dispersion. Therefore, I argue that residual wage dispersion not only
accounts for most of the level and trend of overall wage dispersion,4 but also for its
cyclical properties.
Empirical evidence suggests that the degree of wage dispersion prevailing among
similar workers increases during booms and lessens during recessions. This fact, in
1The definition of income generally includes items such as social security benefits, unemploy-
ment compensation, public assistance, retirement benefits, and dividends, in addition to wages.
2See Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004), Castaneda, Diaz-Gimenez, and Rios-Rull (1998),
Bonhomme and Hospido (2012) and Guvenen, Ozkan, and Song (2012)
3The recent OECD (2011) report on the rise in inequality observed for the past fifty years
identifies greater inequality in wages and salaries as the main factor that caused an intensification
of economic inequality within OECD countries.
4See Krueger and Summers (1988) and Mortensen (2005) for an estimation of the magnitude
of residual wage dispersion. See Eckstein and Éva Nagypál (2004) and Katz and Autor (1999)
for an assessment of the importance of residual wage dispersion in driving the long run growth of
wage inequality. More details in Section 3.
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turn, motivates the development of a dynamic model of the labor market enabling
analysis of channels through which the business cycle affects residual wage disper-
sion. The present paper develops a tractable dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
model of the labor market. This model draws together monopsonistic firms which
unilaterally set wages and compete for workers, and homogeneous workers who de-
rive some market power from this inter-firm competition. Search frictions prevailing
in the labor market render the matching process between workers and firms costly
and time-consuming. Thus, by limiting the number of job offers that workers re-
ceive, search frictions give firms some monopsony power, i.e., the ability to impose
wage levels on workers. Firms exploit their monopsony power when setting wages
below the frictionless (competitive) wage level. Given that the extent to which
firms exercise their monopsony power affects their hiring and turnover rates, firms
face a trade-off between the profit that they realize for each worker and the relative
ease with which they hire and retain their workers.5 Consistently with the existing
literature, this trade-off leads to differential wage-setting strategies across firms,
and thus to residual wage dispersion.6 Moreover, because I allow for match specific
investment by firms in line with Mortensen (1998), the equilibrium residual wage
distribution is unimodal and positively skewed, as empirically observed.
I establish that business cycle fluctuations translate into procyclical fluctuations
in residual wage dispersion through the following two-step mechanism. First, the
business cycle affects the firms’ monopsony power by altering the value of workers’
outside option. In booms, the jump in vacancies brings workers to receive more and
better job offers. Consequently, the competition across firms over workers becomes
tougher. Firms face a drop in the probability of acceptance of their job offers,
and their market power therefore erodes. Second, firms strategically react to this
change in labor market conditions by modifying their vacancy posting decisions.
During a boom, the vacancy filling duration increases for all vacancy types, but
increases relatively more for low-paying vacancies, lowering the incentive of firms
to propose these vacancies. Therefore, the composition of vacancies changes as the
proportion of highly paying vacancies rises. This change translates into a rightward
shift of the mass and a thickening of the upper tail of the residual wage distribution.
As a result, the change in the shape of the residual wage distribution generates a
widening of the residual wage structure and a rise in residual wage dispersion. The
opposite mechanism operates during recessions. The model therefore predicts that
residual wage dispersion acts procyclically, and hence, can account for the empirical
5Using Danish data, Christensen, Lentz, Mortensen, Neumann, andWerwatz (2005) empirically
show that the search effort of employed workers declines with the wage they earn.
6For a literature review on earlier analyses of the residual wage dispersion, see Appendix A.
2
evidence of positive co-movement between (residual) wage dispersion and GDP at
business cycle frequencies.
The endogenous nature of the inter-firm competition, stemming from the en-
dogenous number of offers that workers receive each period, is a crucial feature
of the model, since such competition plays a main role in shaping wage distribu-
tion. Inter-firm competition is an essential determinant of the rent-sharing process
between firms and workers.7 So, incorporating it into a search and matching frame-
work allows a better understanding of what drives firms to exploit their monopsony
power and why the intensity with which they exploit it evolves with the business
cycle. Moreover, assessing the sensitivity of the firms’ monopsony power to the
business cycle is an indispensable step in investigating the channels through which
the business cycle affects residual wage dispersion. For this reason, I endogenize the
average number of job offers, and in so doing, I endogenize the out-of-unemployment
and the job-to-job flows. I solve for the dynamics of the model by making use of the
free entry equilibrium condition which states that the value of posting a vacancy
must be equal to zero in equilibrium for any wage level in the range of offered wages.
These flows have previously been endogenized by Menzio and Shi (2010a, 2010b) in
models with directed search. This assumption of directed search is indeed necessary
to obtain dynamic predictions of models in which the free entry condition does not
hold, but considerably narrows the range of interactive strategies between firms and
workers.
This paper is, to my knowledge, the first study that documents the procyclicality
of wage dispersion and develops a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of
the labor market to examine the channels through which the business cycle shapes
the residual wage distribution, and thus, alters residual wage dispersion. I seek
to contribute to two strands of the literature. First, my paper adds on to the
growing literature on dynamic search and matching with wage dispersion. Following
Burdett and Mortensen (1998), several authors have proposed deterministic models
of wage dispersion,8 and only a few of them extended the analysis to stochastic
7See Cahuc, Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2006) for a study of the determinants of the wage-setting
process. Using a panel of French administrative data, they find that inter-firm competition is an
essential determinant of the workers’ market power and results in a large rise in wages above the
reservation level.
8See for example Mortensen (1990), Green, Machin, and Manning (1996), Mortensen (1998)
and Acemoglu (2001). An important contribution is the paper by Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002),
which distinguishes three sources of wage dispersion: productive heterogeneity of workers, pro-
ductive heterogeneity of firms and search frictions. The importance of search frictions, and hence
of the threat of inter-firm competition, in pushing wages up is also taken into consideration by
Carrillo-Tudela and Smith (2009). In both papers, the resulting wage dispersion is in keeping with
empirical regularities.
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models.9 Based on a dynamic stochastic model with heterogeneous agents and
wage bargaining, Robin (2011) studies the cyclical behavior of the labor market.
He highlights the differential volatility and productivity elasticity of each decile
of the wage distribution and shows that low and high wages are more elastic and
volatile than intermediate wages, without providing an investigation of the cyclical
properties of wage dispersion.
Second, I contribute to the literature on wage and income dispersion.10 Existing
studies mainly point towards income inequality behaving countercyclically. Using
CPS data, Castaneda, Diaz-Gimenez, and Rios-Rull (1998) find that the lowest
quintile of the income distribution in the US is both the most volatile and the most
procyclical. The procyclicality of the income shares then decreases monotonically
and increases for the top 5 percent. This results suggest that income dispersion
lessens in booms.11 The literature seems much more silent on the issue of the
cyclical properties of wage dispersion. Yet, wage dispersion is, together with the
unemployment rate, transfers and hours worked, a main source of income inequality.
An exception is the paper by Bonhomme and Hospido (2012) which documents the
evolution of labor earnings inequality in Spain from 1988 to 2010 and find that male
earnings inequality was strongly countercyclical during that period. Our method-
ologies differ manifold. First, the authors do not isolate the cyclical component
of wage inequality and provide both long-run and short-run explanations to the
evolution of wage inequality over time. Second, due to data limitations, the au-
thors use daily earnings as their main earnings measure instead of hourly wages.
This choice which might enhance the procyclicality of wages and, depending on
the workers category most hit by fluctuations in hours worked, might intensify the
countercyclicality of wage dispersion.
The present paper also complements the literature on wage and income risk,
generally defined as the variance of individual labor income changes. Using PSID
data, Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004) obtain that the idiosyncratic labor-
market risk, as measured by the variance of the random component of a household’s
income, is countercyclical. Using the same dataset and a multilevel Bayesian model,
MacKay and Papp (2012) find similar results. To complement their empirical anal-
9Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2010) perform the first analysis of aggregate stochastic dynamics
in the class of search wage-posting models originating with Burdett and Mortensen (1998).
10I refer to wage dispersion as the wage dispersion that exists among employed workers and to
income dispersion or income inequality as the dispersion of income (transfers included) that exists
among all types of workers (unemployed and employed). Income dispersion therefore contains
wage dispersion.
11The authors define income as all monetary income earned before personal taxes. It includes
items such as social security benefits, unemployment compensation, public assistance, retirement
benefits, and dividends, but it excludes non-cash benefits, such as health benefits.
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ysis, the authors also propose a partial equilibrium analysis of a steady-state model
with on-the-job search in which the job offer and separation rates as well as the dis-
tribution of offered wages are taken as given. The countercyclical behavior of wage
risk is mostly driven by the procyclical fluctuations in the reservation wage. Guve-
nen, Ozkan, and Song (2012), who make use of a confidential database containing
uncapped earnings data, distance themselves from the literature with their finding
that income shocks are acyclical. Nonetheless, they observe that the left-skewness
of shocks is strongly countercyclical.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides empirical evidence on the
procyclicality of wage dispersion and residual wage dispersion. Section 3 presents
the model embedding wage posting into a search and matching model in which
job searchers can get multiple job offers each period. I show how residual wage
dispersion arises in such a framework and explain the source of the firms’ monopsony
power. Section 4 describes the equilibrium and Section 5 displays the calibration
strategy. Section 6 explains how I solve for the dynamics of the model out of
the steady state and presents a dynamic analysis of the labor market, with an
emphasis on the cyclical properties of firms’ monopsony power and of the residual
wage dispersion. Section 7 concludes.
2 Empirical evidence of the procyclicality of wage
dispersion
I start by presenting several stylized facts on the evolution of (residual) wage dis-
persion. I complete the empirical analysis by examining the cyclical behavior of
(residual) wage dispersion over the period 1967-2005.
2.1 Wage dispersion and residual wage dispersion
I make use of the CPS - March database constructed by Heathcote, Perri, and
Violante (2010) for their empirical analysis of the rise in inequality from 1967 to
2005. I construct an hourly wages series by dividing annual earnings by the total
number of hours worked. By construction, hourly wages are therefore over-sensitive
to the number of hours worked. Hence, I restrict the sample to full-time workers
(total hours per year > 1750) in order to minimize the effect of changes in hours
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worked on the evolution of and fluctuations in the measure of hourly wages.12 13
Moreover, I restrict the sample to male household-head workers.
Figure 1 displays the evolution of wage dispersion over the period 1967-2005.
Wage dispersion is measured by the variance of log hourly real wages of full-time
male workers. My main observations are twofold. First, the US wage distribution
widened substantially over the period analyzed. A large literature has emerged doc-
umenting this trend, and proposing theoretical grounds for comprehending it. 14
Its sources have been clarified by splitting overall inequality into between-group and
within-group wage differentials. Changes in the relative wages of different groups
of workers, distinguished by observable characteristics such as gender, education,
experience, or race, have played some role in shaping the increasing trend of wage
dispersion.15 16 However, most of the overall wage dispersion cannot be accounted
for by workers’ characteristics differentials.17 More importantly, most of the long
run growth in wage dispersion cannot be accounted for by changes in these ob-
servable characteristic differentials.18 This means that residual wage dispersion, i.e.
dispersion of wages within narrowly defined demographic and skill groups of work-
ers, has driven most of the level and trend of overall wage inequality. This result
is confirmed by Figure 1, which displays both the evolution of wage dispersion and
residual wage dispersion over time.
Second, wage dispersion features sizable deviations from its trend. This ob-
servation is brought out in Figure 2, which plots the cyclical component of wage
dispersion obtained by HP-filtering the series. I estimate a Mincerian wage regres-
sion controlling for demographic variables: gender, race, age, education, marital
status and composition of the household. Because of the increasing trend in wages,
12This restriction also allows me to minimize the noisiness of the estimate of total hours worked
documented by Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2005) and Lemieux (2006)
13The results displayed in the next paragraph are not sensitive to this assumption. The cross
correlations results are qualitatively and quantitatively very similar.
14See, for example, Heathcote, Perri, and Violante (2010), Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2008),
Card and DiNardo (2002), Lemieux (2006) and Katz and Murphy (1992).
15The increasing college/high school wage premium that has mainly been observed since the
1970s has been proposed as a source of the widening of wage dispersion. See Bound and Johnson
(1992) and Katz and Murphy (1992).
16See Katz and Autor (1999) and Eckstein and Éva Nagypál (2004) for an analysis of changes
in wage differentials between groups.
17Krueger and Summers (1988) examine the magnitude of wage differentials for equally skilled
workers and find that there are important variations in wages which cannot be explained by human
capital differences. See also Mortensen (2005) for an estimation of the relative importance of work-
ers’ characteristics and firms’ characteristics in explaining wage dispersion; hence an estimation
of the magnitude of residual wage dispersion.
18See, for example, Eckstein and Éva Nagypál (2004). They control for occupational categories
in addition to education, experience, gender, region and race.
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I run this regression for each year.19 By plotting the cyclical component of residual
wage dispersion as obtained by the Mincerian regression, I can compare the short-
run fluctuations of these two series. Importantly, the fluctuations in wage dispersion
seem to be almost entirely driven by the fluctuations in residual wage dispersion.
This result indicates that residual wage dispersion not only accounts for most of the
level and trend of the overall wage dispersion, but also for its cyclical properties.
Therefore it is necessary to understand the source of the short-run fluctuations in
residual wage dispersion in order to assess the cyclical properties of wage dispersion.
Figure 1: Wage dispersion, residual wage dispersion and trends over time
Note: The trends of wage dispersion and residual wage dispersion are obtained by detrending both
time series using an HP-filter of parameter 6.25.
2.2 Cyclical properties of wage dispersion and residual wage
dispersion
I focus on four inequality concepts: the variance of log wages, the ratio between the
90th and the 10th percentile, the ratio between the 90th and the 50th percentile
and the ratio between the 50th and the 10th percentile. The decomposition of the
90/10 P-ratio into the 90/50 and 50/10 P-ratios allows for a sharper picture of
inequality in different parts of the distribution and permits an assessment of the
relative importance of changes in the lower and upper halves of the wage distribution
to changes in the overall wage inequality.
19As a robustness check, I perform the same exercise without this time trend in the regression.
Results are displayed in Table 4 (in Appendix). The results hold.
7
The analysis of the cyclical properties of these inequality measures requires the
series to be stationary. I perform Dickey-Fuller stationarity tests20 on each of the
four inequality series, both for wage inequality and residual wage inequality. All
these series are non-stationary, a result which is consistent with the observed in-
creasing trend in wage inequality. I apply an HP-filter of parameter 6.25 on the
inequality series in order to study the co-movements at business cycle frequencies
between inequality and two HP-filtered macroeconomic times series, real GDP and
the unemployment rate,2122 which are two indicators of the business cycle. The
cross-correlations between these HP-filtered inequality measures and the business
cycle indicators are presented in Tables 1 and 2. All the inequality measures are pos-
itively correlated with real GDP and negatively correlated with the unemployment
rate, indicating that both wage dispersion and residual wage dispersion behaved
procyclically over the period 1967-2005. Moreover, wage inequality movements are
synchronized with GDP and are synchronized with or tend to lead the unemploy-
ment rate. This leading property can be explained by the slight lag with which
the unemployment rate itself responds to GDP. The correlations between the busi-
ness cycle and the skewnesses of the density functions of the wage distribution and
the residual wage distribution are negative. This result points towards a rightward
shift of the mass of the wage distributions during periods of growth. However, the
correlation is not significantly different from zero.
As a robustness check, I apply other detrending procedures, namely, an HP-
filter with parameter 100, first differencing and a Baxter and King band pass filter.
Table 5 (in the Appendix) displays the cross-correlations between the four inequality
measures and GDP. The results are qualitatively and quantitatively very similar.
In order to highlight the positive correlation between residual wage dispersion
and real GDP, I plot the evolution of the cyclical components of these two series
over the period 1967-2005 (Figure 3). Except for the 1980-1982 recession, residual
wage dispersion and real GDP positively co-move, an observation which confirms
the results displayed in Table 1. Moreover, Figure 3 shows the symmetry in the
magnitude of the residual wage dispersion’s fluctuations in periods of growth com-
pared to periods of recession. Finally, one can note the slight asymmetry in the
correlation between the two series, the strength of the co-movement being higher
in periods of growth compared to periods of recessions.
20Given the sensitivity of the Dickey-Fuller test, I perform the test with different options: default
specification, no constant and trend.
21Source: BLS, Major Sector Productivity and Costs, Real gross domestic product in the non-
farm business sector.
22Source: BLS, Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, Unemployment rate,
Civilian non-institutional population 16 years old and over.
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Figure 2: Wage dispersion and residual wage dispersion – Cyclical components
Note: The cyclical components of wage dispersion and residual wage dispersion are obtained by
detrending both time series using an HP-filter of parameter 6.25.
Figure 3: Residual wage dispersion and Real GDP – Cyclical components
Note: The cyclical components of residual wage dispersion and GDP are obtained by detrending
both time series using an HP-filter of parameter 6.25.
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The institutional factors,23 the non-market factors24 and the market factors
linked to changes in production technology,25 which have been proposed as possible
drivers of the widening of the cross-sectional wage distribution over time, are either
long-run evolutions or episodic events. For this reason, these arguments cannot
be used to explain the cyclical properties of wage dispersion. In the following
section, I develop a theoretical framework which allows me to examine the sources
of fluctuations in wage dispersion, and I show how changes in aggregate productivity
can drive these fluctuations.
3 The model
The previous section presented empirical evidence for the procyclical behavior of
wage dispersion and residual wage dispersion. The rest of the paper develops a
dynamic model of the labor market with on-the-job search which accounts for these
cyclical properties. This theoretical framework allows me to detail and explain the
channel through which the business cycle impacts equilibrium wage distribution.
3.1 General set-up
3.1.1 Overview
The theoretical setting builds on Burdett and Mortensen (1998)’s model. I main-
tain the assumption of an imperfect labor market due to search frictions and the
assumption of on-the-job search which enables workers to switch to better jobs.
Unlike Burdett and Mortensen (1998), time is discrete and job seekers can receive
multiple job offers during each period. This assumption has valuable advantages.
First, it allows me to distinguish between the meeting process and the matching
one. Firms make take-it-or-leave-it wage offers to workers and matches are formed
only when these offers are accepted by the workers. This allows analysis of the
extent to which the workers’ job-acceptance decisions constrain firms’ wage setting
decisions, in a setting which disregards any type of explicit bargaining. Second,
23Card and DiNardo (2002) stress the importance of non-market factors, specifically the falling
real minimum wage, in explaining the rise in inequality during the 1980s.
24Lemieux (2006) argues that most of the growth in residual wage dispersion is mechanically
accounted for by changes in the workforce composition, that is by the increasing employment
share of specific groups of workers (typically college graduates) which is characterized by more
dispersed wages.
25Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2008) challenge these claims and propose a multi-causal interpre-
tation where market-driven shifts in demand for skills, imputable to skill-biased technical changes,
played a central role in modelling the long run pattern displayed by wage inequality over the last
four decades.
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I am proposing a richer framework in which firms’ wage-setting decisions are not
only constrained by the strategic behavior of employed workers, who can choose to
keep or to quit their current job, but also by the strategic behavior of unemployed
workers: each unemployed worker getting more than one job offer will opt for the
best wage contract and the remaining vacancies will be left idle.
Firms post take-it-or-leave-it wage offers. Once a wage contract is accepted
by a worker, the wage remains constant during the whole employment relationship
duration. Firms are committed to the wage contract that they propose, in the sense
that they cannot renegotiate it in periods in which aggregate productivity is so low
that the firm’s surplus lies below the vacancy cost. Similarly, workers cannot quit
in periods in which the current reservation wage exceeds the wage which has been
accepted at the beginning of the employment spell. This assumption allows me
to rule out discontinuity issues when analyzing the Bellman equation of the firms’
surplus.
Time is discrete. Each period is characterized by the following sequence of
events: exogenous separation, meeting process, matching process and production.
At the beginning of the period, a proportion λ of the existing matches exogenously
splits up. Subsequently, the meeting process takes place. Due to search frictions,
each searching worker only meets a limited number of vacant firms each period.
Firms make take-it-or-leave-it offers to job candidates. In the case of acceptance,
matches are created. At the end of the period, production takes places and salaries
and unemployment benefits are paid.
The level of aggregate productivity z follows an AR(1) process and is revealed at
the beginning of each period. The state of the economy at the beginning of time t is
therefore summarized by the triple (zt, ut, Gt−1(w)), where ut denotes the beginning-
of-period unemployment rate and Gt−1(w)) denotes the share of employed workers
earning less than the wage w at the end of period t− 1.
3.2 Workers
Meeting process. A continuum of identical workers of measure 1 participates in
the labor market. In each period, unemployed and employed workers look for a job.
Due to the search frictions which characterize the labor market, job seekers make
contact with a limited number of firms. For the sake of simplicity, I assume that
frictions are such that each vacant firm only contacts one candidate per period.26 I
26It could easily be extended to more complex cases. An intuitive pattern would be that firms
are able to contact a higher number of job applicants during economic slowdowns. Such a coun-
tercyclical average number of candidates would strengthen the results.
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denote by st the average number of offers that job seekers receive.
I assume random matching. Unemployed and employed workers are therefore
contacted by any firm. The number of offers Ot received by a worker follows a
binomial distribution of parameters (vt, stvt ), where vt denotes the level of vacancies,
and can be approximated by a Poisson distribution of parameter st for large values
of vt. The probability that an employed or unemployed worker receives k offers is
therefore:
P (Ot = k) =
e−stskt
k!
Offer acceptance decision. As in Burdett and Mortensen (1998), I propose a
matching process whereby employers do not respond to the job offers that their
employees receive from poaching firms.27
The job acceptance rules are as follows. If an unemployed worker only receives
one offer during the period, he accepts it with probability one, as long as the
proposed wage provides welfare that exceeds the value of unemployment. However,
if the unemployed worker receives k offers, he accepts one offer wo (the superscript
o denotes wage/job offers) only if it is the highest, which occurs with probability
Ft(w
o)k−1, where Ft(w) is the cumulative distribution function of wage offers at
time t. The probability aUt (wo) that an unemployed worker accepts an offer wo,
conditional on getting at least one offer, is therefore:
aUt (w
o) =
∞∑
k=1
PU(Ot = k)
PU(Ot ≥ 1)Ft(w
o)k−1
aUt (w
o) =
e−st(1−Ft(w
o)) − e−st
Ft(wo)(1− e−st) (1)
(see Appendix B for the derivation details), and the probability of flowing out of
27Alternatively, Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) propose considering that firms are able to make
counter-offers in order to prevent their employees from quitting. The current and alternative em-
ployers are therefore brought into a Bertrand price competition, resulting, in the case in which
firms are homogeneous, in the wage rising up to the competitive level. This assumption is sub-
sequently used by several authors: Cahuc, Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2006), Robin (2011) and
Carrillo-Tudela and Smith (2009), for instance. I choose not to exploit this alternative assump-
tion as my goal is to examine how the strategic wage-setting decision of firms is constrained by
the behavior of workers, a behavior which itself stems from the intensity of inter-firm competition,
even in the absence of any bargaining interaction between workers and firms. Nevertheless, I
expect such an alternative assumption to strengthen my results. A jump in vacancies following
a positive shock brings workers to face a higher number of offers. The probability that at least
one wage offer exceeds the current wage, and therefore that the current firm enters in a Bertrand
competition with another firm, increases. The average effective monopsony power of firms will
substantially decrease as each competing firm entirely loses its market power.
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unemployment is:
pUt = 1− PU(Ot = 0)
pUt = 1− e−st (2)
For employed workers who are looking for a job, the wage acceptance rule is as
follows. An employed worker accepts the highest wage offer obtained during the
period on condition that it is higher than the wage he is earning in his current job.
The conditional probability aEt (wo) that an unemployed worker who currently earns
a wage w accepts an offer wo is therefore:
aEt (w
o) = 1wo>w
∞∑
k=1
PE(Ot = k)
PE(Ot ≥ 1)Ft(w
o)k−1
aEt (w
o) = 1wo>w
e−st(1−Ft(w
o)) − e−st
Ft(wo)(1− e−st) (3)
Empirical evidence shows that the proportion of employed workers searching for
a job is low, and relatedly, that the job-to-job rate is much smaller than the out-
of-unemployment rate.28 Therefore, I assume that all unemployed workers look for
a job with probability one but that each employed worker has a certain probability
e(w) ∈ (0, 1) with ∂e(w)/∂w < 0 to be searching for a job. I assume the following
functional form for e(w):
e(w) =
(1− w
1− w
)α
where α ≥ 0. Workers who are employed at the lowest wage w have a probability
of one of looking for a job. This probability is decreasing and approaching 0 for
employed workers in the upper tail of the distribution.
Consequently, the probability of quitting the current job paying w (or probability
of getting a job offer paying at least w) is:
pEt (w) = e(w)
∞∑
k=0
PE(Ot = k)(1− Ft(w)k)
pEt (w) = e(w)
(
1− e−st(1−Ft(w))) (4)
As a result, the vacancy filling rate for a firm proposing a wage wo can be
28From SIPP data, Nagypal (2008) estimates the average job-to-job rate to be 0.022. Using
CPS data, Fallick and Fleischman (2004) and Nagypal (2008) respectively find this rate equal to
0.027 and 0.029. Moscarini and Thomsson (2006) find a slightly higher rate, 3.2%, by treating
missing observations.
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expressed as follows:
qt(w
o) =
ut
ut + e¯(1− ut)a
U
t (w
o) +
e¯(1− ut)
ut + e¯(1− ut)Gt−1(w
o)aEt (w
o) (5)
where e¯ is the average job searching probability among employed workers, Gt(w)
is the end-of-period cumulative distribution function of wages and, accordingly,
Gt(w
o) is the fraction of employed workers earning a wage lower than wo.
Lowest wage rate. wt denotes the lowest wage rate that an unemployed worker
will accept. Given that no worker would accept a wage providing a lower utility
than the utility of unemployment, wt is obtained from the following equality:
Wt(wt) = Ut (6)
where Wt(w) is the value to the worker of working for a wage w and Ut is the value
of unemployment. Ut and Wt(w) are defined as:
Ut = b+ Et
[
βpUt+1
∫ w¯t+1
wt+1
Wt+1(wt+1)dFt+1(wt+1) + β(1− pUt+1)Ut+1
]
and
Wt(w) = w + Et
[
β(1− λ)(1− pEt+1(w))Wt+1(w)
+ β(1− λ)pEt+1(w)
∫ w¯t+1
w
Wt+1(wt+1)dFt+1(wt+1)
+ βλpUt+1
∫ w¯t+1
wt+1
Wt+1(wt+1)dFt+1(wt+1)
+ βλ(1− pUt+1)Ut+1
]
An employed worker receiving a wage w becomes unemployed if his employment
relationship exogenously ends and if he does not find a job straight off. With a
probability (1− λ)pEt+1(w), the worker gets poached by a more generous firm. If he
neither get poached nor resigns, the employment relationship proceeds at rate w.
3.3 Firms
Vacancy posting decision. In order to avoid issues linked to intra-firm wage het-
erogeneity, I consider one-job firms. As in Mortensen (1998), firms are ex-ante
homogenous but ex-post heterogeneity in productivity arises because of inter-firm
differential in capital investment. kt(w) represent the specific capital a firm invests
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in a match formed at time t and proposing a wage w. This investment is realized
once the worker and the firm are matched. f(kt(w)) denotes the idiosyncratic match
productivity, with f ′kt(w)(kt(w)) > 0 and f
′′
kt(w)
(kt(w)) < 0.
Employers play an active role not only as job creators but also as wage-setters.
Wages are set so as to maximize the value of a vacancy. Free entry, however, ensures
that, in equilibrium, this value is equal to zero at any time t. The value of posting
a vacancy paying w is equal to:
Vt(w) = −c+ qt(w)(Jt(kt(w), w)− kt(w)) + Etβ(1− qt(w))Vt+1(w)
where c is the cost of posting a vacancy, β is the discount rate and Jtkt(w) is the
time t value of a job for a firm proposing a wage w and investing kt(w) in the match
. Jt(kt(w), w) can be written:
Jt(kt, w) =ztf(kt)− w + Et
[
β(1− λ)(1− pEt+1(w))Jt+1(kt(w), w)
+ β[λ+ (1− λ)pEt+1(w)]Vt+1(w)
]
where zt is the aggregate productivity level. Note that Vt(w) is the value of a va-
cancy for the firm at the moment the vacancy is posted, i.e., before the matching
process. In contrast, Jt(kt(w), w) is the value of employment for the firm at the
moment production takes place, i.e., after the matching process.
In equilibrium, free entry drives the value of a vacancy Vt to zero for any wage
level. Plugging this condition into the value functions of a vacancy and a job, I
obtain the job creation curve:
Jt(kt(w), w) =
c
qt(w)
− kt(w) (7)
= ztf(kt(w))− w + Etβ(1− λ)(1− pEt+1(w))(
c
qt+1(w)
− kt(w)) (8)
The optimal investment given that the wage w is offered is:
kt(w) = argmax(Jt(kt(w), w)− kt(w)) (9)
kt(w) = f
′−1((1− Etβ(1− λ)(1− pEt+1(w)))/zt) (10)
Given that the job-to-job rate decreases with the wage, the optimal investment
level is an increasing function of the wage. Indeed, firms proposing relatively high
wages have an incentive to make larger match-specific investments as their jobs
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remain filled for a longer period of time. As a result, high-paying firms have a higher
capital labor ratio and are more productive. Such heterogeneity in productivity is
endogenous and arises even though firms are ex-ante similar.
Plugging Equation 9 into Equation 7, I can rewrite the job creation curve as
such:
c
qt(w)
= ztgt(w)− w + Etβ(1− λ)(1− pEt+1(w))
c
qt+1(w)
(11)
where gt(w) = f(kt(w))− f ′(kt(w))kt(w) with g′w(w) > 0.
Highest wage rate. w¯t is the upper bound of the range of wage rates for which
the zero-value vacancy equilibrium condition is respected. Above this threshold,
the value of a filled vacancy Jt(w¯t + ) would lie below c/qt(w¯t + ) so that either
the time t value of the vacancy would be negative or the time t + 1 value of the
vacancy would be required to be positive.
3.4 Stocks and flows
ut denotes the beginning-of-period rate of unemployment, whereas nt denotes the
employment rate once the matching process has taken place. Therefore:
nt = 1− (1− pUt )ut (12)
and
ut = 1− (1− λ)nt−1 (13)
Plugging equation (12) into (13), I obtain the law of motion of the end-of-period
employment rate:
nt = (1− λ)nt−1 + pUt (1− nt−1(1− λ))
Turning now to the job-to-job flows, notice that ntGt(w) represents the end-of-
period number of employed workers currently earning less than w. This specific
pool of workers increases with the flow of unemployed workers finding a job paying
less than w and decreases with the flow of employed workers previously in that pool
whose contract exogenously ends or who switch to a new job paying more than w:
ntGt(w) = nt−1Gt−1(w)(1− λ)(1− pEt (w)) + utpUt Ft(w) (14)
Note that, as on-the-job movements takes place up the ladder, the distribu-
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tion of wages earned over employed workers first-order stochastically dominates the
distribution of wages offered to job seekers.29
3.5 Equilibrium wage dispersion
The free entry condition also states that each vacancy type is equally valuable,
which allows the possibility of wage dispersion in equilibrium. Indeed, for any
wage offer in the bargaining set, the corresponding vacancy filling rate and job-
to-job rate ensure the equilibrium condition. To see this, consider equation (7).
Wage dispersion arises due to the fact that firms play a mixed strategy in the wage
posting game, trading-off between the current profit per worker (∂ztf(kt(w))−w
∂w
< 0),
on the one hand, and the vacancy filling rate (∂qt(w)
∂w
> 0) and the quitting rate
(∂p
E
t (w)
∂w
< 0), on the other. As a result, an equilibrium can be supported in which
each vacancy type is equally valuable. In particular, we have:
Vt(w) = Vt(wt) = 0 ∀w
which can be rewritten as follows:
qt(w)(Jt(w)− kt(w)) = qt(wt)(Jt(wt)− kt(wt)) ∀w (15)
The ratio of vacancy durations equals the ratio of expected profits from opening a
vacancy. This last equation pins down Ft(w), which is the equilibrium wage offer
distribution function. Once Ft(w) is determined, nature chooses the type of each
firm.
The continuity of the equilibrium wage offer distribution is a condition that must
be satisfied. In order to understand the reason for this, let us consider a mass point
at the wage level w∗ ∈]wt, w¯t]. Firms proposing such a wage have an incentive to
deviate by proposing a slightly lower wage. In so doing, they only slightly decrease
the probability of finding a worker (given the absence of mass at the wage level
w∗ − ) and increase their per period profit. The possibility of a mass point at the
reservation wage is also ruled out. A slight increase in the proposed wage would
decrease the per period profit but would greatly increase the probability of filling
the vacancy.
29See Mortensen (1990) for a demonstration.
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4 Solving the model
In this section, I first define the decentralized equilibrium. Then, I present my
calibration strategy. Finally, I describe how I solve for the dynamics of the model.
4.1 Equilibrium
The economy is in a decentralized equilibrium at all times; that is, all firms maxi-
mize their profits and all workers optimally choose the wage offer to accept.
Definition: A decentralized equilibrium is a sequence of optimal vacancy posting
decisions {st}∞t=0, wage offer dispersions and wage dispersions {Ft(w), Gt(w)}∞t=0,
acceptance rates {aUt (w), aEt (w)}∞t=0, out-of-unemployment and job-to-job rates {pUt , pEt (w)}∞t=0,
vacancy filling rates {qt(w)}∞t=0, reservation rates {wt}∞t=0, employment and unem-
ployment rates {nt, ut}∞t=0 such that the following conditions are satisfied:
1. From the free entry condition, each vacancy type in (wt, w¯t) has zero value.
Outside this range, the value of posting a vacancy is negative.30 The job
creation curve (11) determines the equilibrium level of overall vacancies (or
average number of job offers).
2. The time t value of the equilibrium wage offer distribution at the wage level
w is pinned down by equation (15).
3. The law of motion of the cumulative distribution function of current wages
Gt(w) is presented by equation (14).
4. The sequence of reservation wages is determined by equation (6).
5. Unemployed and employed workers accept job offers as described by equations
(1) and (3).
6. The out-of-unemployment and the job-to-job flows are framed by equations (2)
and (4).
7. The vacancy filling rate satisfies equation (5).
8. Unemployment and employment stocks evolve according to equations (12) and
(13).
30A firm proposing a wage below wt would pay a cost for posting a vacancy which has a zero
probability of being filled. A firm proposing a wage above w¯t would get a profit which would be
too small to compensate the vacancy cost.
20
The dynamics of the model are obtained by taking a log-linear approximation
of the aggregate productivity process and of equations (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6),
(12), (13), (14), (11) and (15) around the steady state.
5 Calibration
Table 3: Calibration
Description Parameter Value
Stochastic process for labor productivity
Autocorrelation ρ 0.98
Standard deviation σ 0.0086
Mean labor productivity z 1
Other parameters
Discount rate β 0.991/3
Exogenous separation rate λ 0.1/3
Unemployment income b¯ set to target b/E(w) = 0.6
Vacancy posting cost c 0.3026 set to target pU = 0.45
Curvature of the searching effort α set to target E(pE(w)) = 0.026
Function
Firm heterogeneity g0(w) set to target a log normal res. wage
distribution of param. (-0.45,0.12)
Note: Monthly calibration.
The calibration of the model is described in Table 3. These values are chosen to
match US data.
I interpret a period as a month. The discount factor is set to 0.991/3 which
corresponds to a yearly interest rate of 4% commonly used in the macro-RBC
literature.
The log productivity level zt is assumed to follow an AR(1) process: log(zt) =
ρ log(zt−1) + t where  ∼ N(0, σ2). The persistence of the technology shock is set
to ρ = 0.98 and the standard deviation to σ = 0.0086. This standard calibration
is used by Rogerson and Shimer (2010) and is based on the estimations of Cooley
and Prescott (1995). The mean of z is normalized to one.
Each match has a probability of ending λ set to 0.1/3. This value is within the
broadly accepted range of 8%− 10% proposed by Hall (2005) and is similar to that
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of Shimer (2005), who measures this exit probability at 0.1/3 on average in the
US. I target the probability pU that an unemployed worker forms a match in the
period to 45%, implying unemployment spells of around two months. This choice
is consistent with Hall (2005), who estimates a monthly job finding rate of 0.48%
and in line with the measure of this rate presented by Rogerson and Shimer (2010)
for the US for the period 1948-2009.
I target the average job-to-job flow rate E(pE(w)) at 0.026, which is consistent
with the most recent empirical evidences.31
In contrast with the other parameters and targets, there exists a debate about
the value of non-work activity b¯ = b/E(w), revived by the paper by Hagedorn and
Manovskii (2008). This paper proposes a new estimate of this value at 0.95. Unlike
Shimer (2005), who restricts the value of non work activity to unemployment ben-
efits and sets b¯ equal to 0.4, Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) additionally integrate
home production and the value of leisure. Delacroix (2006) similarly distinguishes a
home production of 0.3 and unemployment benefit of 0.3 to obtain an overall value
of 0.6. In order to keep my results as plausible as possible, I choose an average
value of 0.6.
The function g0(w) mapping the idiosyncratic match productivity levels to wages
is calibrated as follows. I start by approximating the observed residual wage distri-
bution with a log normal distribution. Figure (4) compares the density function of
the observed residual wages and the density function of the log normal distribution
of parameters (-0.45,0.12) which I use in the calibration. I break the wage range
down by placing a 500-point grid on it. I set my model at its steady state level and
solve it at each grid point taking the (-0.45,0.12) log normal wage distribution as
given. In so doing, I obtain the value of the function g0(w) for each wage level.
6 Dynamics
6.1 Solving the model
In order to solve for the dynamics of the model, and more specifically for the dynam-
ics of the wage dispersion, I make the restrictive assumption that the reservation
wage is constant over time. Which such an assumption and given the specificity
of the model, I obtain that wt = w = b. Moreover, I make use of the fact that
31From SIPP data, Nagypal (2008) estimates the average job-to-job rate to be 0.022. Using
CPS data, Fallick and Fleischman (2004) and Nagypal (2008) respectively find this rate equal to
0.027 and 0.029. Moscarini and Thomsson (2006) find a slightly higher rate, 3.2%, by treating
missing observations.
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Figure 4: Residual wage distribution
the free entry condition is satisfied at any wage level. This equilibrium condition is
crucial as it allows me to reduce the dimension of the state space considerably. The
reasoning is as follows. First, the dynamics of the variables which do not depend
on any wage level (i.e. nt, ut, st and pUt ) are obtained by solving a partition of the
model including only the equations for these variables and the job creation curve of
the firm proposing the reservation wage (equations 2, 12, 13, as well as equations
1, 5 and 11 expressed at the reservation wage), which is characterized by the fact
that the cumulative distribution function of offered wages and of wages are both
equal to zero. Second, by making use of the free entry condition and by equalizing
the value of a vacancy proposing a wage w and the value of the vacancy proposing
the lowest wage, I am able to solve for the dynamics of the value of the cumulative
distribution function of wages at each wage level. Using an N -point (N. = 500)
grid for the wage range, I use the vacancy value equalizing condition (equation 15)
N − 1 times. In so doing, I reduce the problem to a fixed point problem, where
only the past and future values of the cumulative distribution function of wages at
a specific wage level are needed to solve for the problem of the firms proposing that
specific wage level. Note that I do not solve for the dynamics of the functional form
of the wage distribution but rather for the dynamics of the wage distribution for
each wage level.
6.2 Results
6.2.1 General picture
Figure 5 shows the response of a specific labor market (w = median wage ≈ 0.64)
to a positive productivity shock of one standard deviation. In a period of expansion,
the firms’ surplus increases, which leads to a jump in the value of posting vacancies
and hence to an increase in vacancies and in the average number of job offers that
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unemployed and employed workers receive. The labor market becomes tighter. Job
seekers become choosier as they get more job offers and of better quality. As a result,
firms record a decline in the job offer acceptance rates coming from both categories
of workers. The vacancy duration rises, which brings the value of vacancies back to
zero.
Figure 5: Impulse responses to a positive productivity shock
Note: Percentage deviation from the steady state following a positive productivity shock
of one standard deviation. I set w = median wage ≈ 0.64 in this illustration.
Note that the values of the cumulative distribution function of both offered
wages and wages at the median wage decrease, suggesting that the probability that
workers receive and accept relatively bad offers falls in good times. I explain this
result in the following section.
6.2.2 Wage offer distribution
In order to understand how firms react to a change in productivity, I examine how
the firms’ surplus changes for different levels of wage. As discussed by Hagedorn
and Manovskii (2008), what gives the firms the incentive to post vacancies is the
size of the percentage change in profit in response to the change in productivity.
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Figure 6, left-hand panel, presents the percentage change in the firms’ surplus for
all wage levels at the moment of the shock, and shows the following disproportional
effect: the higher the wage, the larger the percentage change in profit, the bigger the
incentive to post vacancies. As a result, firms have a large incentive to post relatively
good vacancies following an increase in productivity. The intuition behind this result
is linked to the change in the workers’ behavior. Indeed, the increase in productivity
pushes up the value of all types of vacancies, but the jump in vacancies makes
workers choosier and exacerbates inter-firm competition over workers. Therefore,
firms proposing relatively low wages face greater difficulties in filling their vacancies
and retain their workers. This second effect attenuates the rise in the value of the
vacancy due to the increase in productivity. As a result, the percentage change
in the firms’ surplus is lower for low-paying firms and the firms’ incentive to post
low-paying vacancies lessens. The distribution of offered wages changes accordingly,
as can be seen in Figure 6, right-hand panel. Following the positive shock, the wage
distribution shifts downwards, illustrating the fact that the composition of vacancies
leans more towards good vacancies compared to before the shock.
Figure 6: Impulse response to a positive productivity shock
Note: Left-hand panel: Immediate (t=1) percentage change in the firms’ surplus J1(w)
in response to a positive shock of one standard deviation for each wage level. Right-hand
panel: Immediate (t=1) percentage change in the cumulative distribution function of
offered wages (F1(w)) in response to a positive shock of one standard deviation for each
wage level.
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6.2.3 Wage dispersion
In expansion, the disproportionate increase in high-paying vacancies modifies the
wage structure and gives way to a downward shift of the wage distribution func-
tion, as displayed in Figure 7. This downward shift indicates that firms have more
incentive to propose relatively high paying vacancies, and that this strategic deci-
sion impacts the distribution function of accepted vacancies. Figure 8 shows the
evolution of the wage density function at the moment of the shock, relative to the
steady-state wage density function. This figure suggests that, in good times, as
the proportion of high paying vacancies increases, the upper tail of the wage den-
sity function thickens and the mass of the wage distribution shifts rightward. This
change in the shape of the wage distribution, in turn, generates a rise in wage dis-
persion. Figure 9 displays the percentage change in the variance of wages for the
ten periods following a positive productivity shock. Wage dispersion clearly behaves
procyclically.
Figure 7: Rightward shift of the mass of the wage distribution
Note: Steady state wage distribution function and t=1 wage distribution function (G1(w)).
6.2.4 Job-to-job rate and composition of hirings
Figure 6.2.4 shows the immediate percentage change in the job-to-job rate for dif-
ferent levels of wages in response to a positive productivity shock. One can notice
the disproportionate jump in this rate for high levels of wages. The rationale behind
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Figure 8: Rightward shift of the mass of the wage distribution
Note: Difference between the immediate (t=1) wage density function and the steady-state
wage density function.
Figure 9: Wage dispersion: impulse response to a positive productivity shock
Note: Percentage deviation from the steady state of the variance of wages following a
positive productivity shock of one standard deviation.
27
this result is grounded on the change in the quality of vacancies. For an unchanged
probability of looking for a job, the probability that the offered wage exceeds the
current one increases more the higher the wage. Two results are obtained. First,
the job-to-job rate behaves procyclically, a result which is consistent with empirical
evidence.32 Second, given that the procyclicality of the job-to-job rate exceeds that
of out-of-unemployment, the composition of hiring is modified towards employed
workers in good times.
Figure 10: Job-to-job rate: impulse response to a positive productivity shock
Note: Immediate (t=1) percentage change in the job-to-job rate in response to a positive
shock of one standard deviation for each wage level.
7 Conclusion
This paper is, to my knowledge, the first study that documents the procyclicality
of wage dispersion and develops a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model
of the labor market to examine the channels through which the business cycle
shapes the residual wage distribution and thus, alters residual wage dispersion.
The empirical evidence presented in the paper first indicates that the short-run
fluctuations in wage dispersion are mainly driven by the short-run fluctuations in
residual wage dispersion. Second, the empirical analysis also shows that, in the US,
wage inequality is positively correlated with GDP and negatively correlated with the
32See, for example, Sherk (2008).
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unemployment rate. These results therefore suggest that wage dispersion behaves
procyclically. The dynamic search wage-posting model that I develop accounts for
this stylized fact.
The mechanism through which the business cycle shapes residual wage disper-
sion is the following. As a consequence of market frictions, every firm has some
power to impose a wage level on its workers. The business cycle, by affecting both
the quantity and quality of job offers, alters the extent to which firms exploit their
monopsony power. In booms, workers become choosier and the monopsony power
of firms erodes. As firms face a drop in their job acceptance rates, they strategically
modify their wage-setting decisions and post disproportionately more high-paying
vacancies. The upper tail of the distribution of wage offers thickens and the mass
shifts rightwards. Similar changes are observed in the distribution of wages. Con-
sequently, wage dispersion rises.
While much literature has recently emerged documenting the reasons for the
level and the trend of wage dispersion, the literature is almost silent on the behavior
of wage dispersion over the business cycle. Yet, wage dispersion is a primary driver
of income dispersion and, as such, spreads over consumption inequality and impacts
the welfare of individuals and households. The analysis of its cyclical properties
undertaken in this paper is therefore essential to reaching a full understanding
of wage dispersion. Moreover, despite being an important component of income
dispersion, wage dispersion and income dispersion seem to have opposite cyclical
properties.33 This observation indicates that factors other than wages are driving
the cyclical properties of income inequality and that these factors are important
enough to counteract the procyclical movements induced by wage dispersion. A
possible candidate for such a driving force is the change over the business cycle in
the employed/unemployed composition of workers. The rise (fall) in the share of
unemployed workers during recessions (booms) pushes income dispersion up (down).
This composition effect could potentially play an important role in causing the
countercyclicality of income dispersion. As such, it needs to be related to the
price (wage) effect documented in the present paper in order to examine how wage
dispersion spreads over income inequality at business cycle frequencies. Such an
investigation will be undertaken in future research.
33Apart from the work by Guvenen, Ozkan, and Song (2012), the existing studies on this issue
all point towards income inequality being countercyclical.
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A Explaining residual wage dispersion
The presence of sizable frictions in the labor market is recognized in the literature.
Diamond (1971) emphasizes the role of search frictions in rising prices from com-
petitive to monopoly levels. As long as frictions are large enough so that a price
increase does not cause the buyer to pay for another search cost in order to get
an alternative price quotation, sellers get full monopoly power. Burdett and Judd
(1983) complete this analysis and point out that, in the case that there is a positive
- but not certain, as in Diamond - probability that each job searcher knows only
one price, firms do not all set their prices at the monopoly level, but instead have
the incentive to offer differing prices. With a specific focus on the labor market,
Manning (2003) argues that the firms behave like monopsonies, not in the sense
that they each stand alone in different sub-markets, but because the supply of la-
bor to each individual firm is not infinitely elastic.34 Indeed, search frictions are
such that both the worker and the firm would be worse off if their employment re-
lationship were to come to an end. Therefore, as long as the wage provides a utility
which is greater than the value of unemployment, a slight decrease in the wage does
not lead to the worker’s resignation. Also, a job seeker might accept a relatively
bad wage offer if he only gets that offer during a certain time span. Hence, search
frictions give firms some monopsony power, a power which is exploited when the
wage is set below the competitive level. Furthermore, wage dispersion at equilib-
rium naturally emerges from this setting. Indeed, the extent to which firms exercise
their monopsony power affects their hiring and turnover rates, but, as long as the
proposed wage remains above the reservation level, each firm eventually does find
workers. Therefore, the trade-off between the profit per worker and the relative ease
with which firms manage to get and retain workers leads to differential wage-setting
strategies across firms. This mechanism is at the core of the model developed by
Burdett and Mortensen (1998). Their pioneering study shows how wage dispersion
at equilibrium can be generated when search frictions are combined with on-the-job
search, in a framework where workers and firms are perfectly homogeneous and
have perfect information.35
34Mortensen (1972) has first shown that search behavior induces an upward-sloping supply curve
to individual firms.
35Parallel to this stream of literature, some authors argue that the equilibrium wage differential
results from unobservable workers heterogeneity (heterogeneity in preferences over non-wage job
characteristics (Bhaskar, Manning, and To (2002)), heterogeneity in unobservable ability (Murphy
and Topel (1987), Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002))) or workers’ incomplete information about the
wage distribution (Winter-Ebmer (1998)).
34
B Job offer acceptance rate and labor market tight-
ness
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